FIRST
DIVISION
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HEIRS OF ENRIQUE DIAZ, Represented by AURORA T. DIAZ, Petitioner, - versus
- ELINOR A. VIRATA, In her capacity as the Administratrix
of the Estate of ANTENOR VIRATA, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 162037 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: August
7, 2006 |
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The instant case involves a protracted controversy which has
seen the demise of the patriarchs of two conflicting families, and is now being
pursued by their respective heirs.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners Heirs of Enrique Diaz, represented by
Aurora T. Diaz, seek the reversal of
the Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72907, dated
The Antecedents
On 13 September 1996, respondent Elinor
Virata, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Antenor Virata
(Antenor), filed with the RTC a Complaint[4]
with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction against Enrique Diaz (Enrique), John Doe,
Richard Doe, and all others taking rights or title under him, praying for the
declaration of the validity of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 4983,[5]
4984,[6]
4985,[7]
4986,[8]
5027,[9]
5028,[10]
5029,[11]
5030,[12]
5031,[13]
5032,[14]
and 5033,[15] all
issued in the name of Antenor S. Virata (Antenor) and registered with the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cavite.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1399-96.
In her Complaint, respondent averred,
inter alia, that: sometime in 1959,
the deceased Antenor purchased from Miguela Crisologo, in good faith and for
consideration, two parcels of land located in Palico, Imus,
In support of her application for restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction, respondent alleged, inter
alia, that: Enrique had fenced
the subject properties and had constructed a driveway thereon; despite respondent’s
demand to desist from fencing the properties and using the same as driveway,
Enrique persisted in his occupation of the subject properties; and respondent
will suffer irreparable injury by the continued occupation, use, and
construction of the driveway traversing the subject properties.
In sum, respondent prayed that
Enrique be ordered to pay jointly and severally with the other defendants
(herein petitioners), reasonable rental for the use of the subject properties
from the time the suit before the DENR was filed in April 1992, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and cost of suit.[19]
On
By way of special and affirmative
defense, Enrique averred that the subject properties, since time immemorial,
was publicly recognized as their family’s ancestral land;[24]
that their actual and peaceful occupation over the subject property was
uninterrupted until sometime in 1962, when Antenor claimed a portion of the
same, on the ground that he purchased said portion from one Miguela Crisologo,
who acquired the same from a certain Simeon Marcial;[25] and
that both Miguela Crisologo and Simeon Marcial recognized and respected his
ownership over the subject properties.[26]
Enrique contended further that the
legal battle between the parties commenced when respondent filed an action for
recovery of possession of the subject property with the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. N-501 entitled, “Antenor Virata v. Fortunata Diaz.” However, in 1969, during the pendency of the
said civil case, Antenor died. Following
the development, the CFI ordered for the substitution of party-plaintiff, but
the heirs of Antenor, including herein respondent, failed to comply
therewith. By reason of their
non-compliance, the CFI rendered an Order,[27]
dated
Further, Enrique raised the argument
of laches and res judicata in his
favor. Anent the claim of laches,
Enrique posited that for a period of almost 27 years after the dismissal of
Civil Case No. N-501, the heirs of Antenor were silent, while he was in actual
and continuous possession of the subject properties in the character and
concept of an owner, until again, his peaceful possession is being disturbed by
the present suit. It is the contention
of Enrique that respondent’s failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to assert her right, created a presumption that she
had abandoned or declined to assert said right.
In raising the ground of res
judicata, Enrique posited that the instant suit, while clothed to appear as
an action for quieting of title, partakes the nature of an action for a
recovery of possession. According to
Enrique, there is res judicata as the
present action and Civil Case No. N-501 involve similar parties, subject
matter, and cause of action.[29]
Consequently, Enrique sought for the
dismissal of the Complaint, and prayed that respondent be ordered to pay
attorney’s fees, including moral, exemplary and actual damages.[30]
On
A relocation survey was conducted on
3, 6, 7, 10, and 13 of January 1997[34]
by Geodetic Engineer Severino Raymundo, who testified in open court that the driveway
was outside Antenor’s property line.[35] Thus, respondent sought a withdrawal of their
application for preliminary injunction, which was granted by the court a quo in the Order[36]
dated
Subsequent thereto, respondent filed
an Amended Complaint[38]
dated
Thus, respondent sought the following
additional reliefs, to wit: (1) an order directing Enrique, his
representatives, or any other person claiming right, title, or interest from
him, to vacate the subject properties and/or to voluntarily surrender possession
thereof to respondent; and (2) the removal and demolition of the barbed wire
fence, concrete fence, concrete house, and other improvements Enrique had
erected thereon.[40]
Holding that the merits of the case
would be served by the Amended Complaint, and finding that Enrique and his
co-defendants would not be prejudiced by the allowance thereof, the court a quo admitted the same, in the Order of
On
After an exchange of pleadings
between the parties, the court a quo
rendered an Order,[48]
dated 14 January 1998, denying Enrique’s Motion for Leave to File Amended
Answer, ratiocinating that Enrique’s allegation of the absence of any record in
the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Cavite, relative to the
reconstitution of TCT No. (T-11171) RT-1228, is a collateral attack to the
decree of registration and the certificate of title which had long been issued
in favor of Antenor. The validity of a
certificate of title can be attacked only in an action expressly filed for the
purpose.[49]
On
In the Pre-Trial Order, dated
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF’S TITLE[S] ARE VALID AND WERE THE ONLY ONES ISSUED OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF SAID PROPERTIES;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM DAMAGES;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA;
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS BARRED BY LACHES; AND
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM DAMAGES. [54]
Trial thereafter ensued. Following respondent’s offer of exhibits, and
at the time when Enrique was scheduled to present evidence, he filed a Motion
to Dismiss[55] dated
On
Aggrieved, Enrique and his
co-defendants sought relief from the Order of
On
In the interim, or specifically, on
Thus, on 24 March 2000, the court a quo ordered petitioners (Enrique’s
heirs and co-defendants) to file the necessary pleading for substitution of
party; otherwise, it will grant respondent’s request for the appointment of an
executor/administrator for Enrique’s Estate.[61] Following respondent’s Manifestation and
Motion to submit the case for resolution, the court a quo rendered a subsequent Order[62]
dated 25 September 2000, granting petitioners ten days from receipt therefrom,
to file their Comment to respondent’s Motion.
On
The Ruling of the RTC
On
Evidence for the
plaintiff shows that Antenor Virata purchased from one Miguela Crisologo in
1959 two (2) parcels of land located at Palico, Imus, Cavite and covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-3855 (Exhibit “P”) and T-11171
(Exhibit “Q”). Antenor bought these
properties after Epifanio Victa, then employed by Virata as a liason officer,
reported to him that the titles to the said properties were clean and that no
encumbrance nor liens had been annotated on its face. Antenor made installment payments for the
subject properties beginning on
Antenor
continued to plant rice on the properties before the same were subdivided in
1963. As a result of said subdivision,
TCT Nos. T-4983, T-4984, T-4985, T-4986, T-5027, T-5028, T-5029, T-5030,
T-5031, T-5032 and T-5033 (Exhibits “A” to “J”), all in the name of Antenor
were issued. After Antenor died in 1969,
his niece Elinor Virata was appointed on
On
x x x x
During
the hearing of this case on
The decretal portion thereof pronounces thus:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding appropriate Antenor
Virata’s titles over the properties located at Palico, Imus,
Accordingly, defendant’s representative or any other claiming right, title or interest from defendant Enrique Diaz are hereby ordered to vacate the properties and/or to voluntarily surrender possession thereof to plaintiff.
Furthermore, defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff the following:
1. P5,000.00
per month as reasonable rental for the use of the subject properties computed
from the date this case was filed on 13 September 1996 until they actually
vacate the same;
2. P30,000.00
as attorney’s fees; and
Cost of suit.
Defendant’s representative and any other claiming right, title or interest from defendant Enrique Diaz are also directed to remove or demolish the barbed wire fence, concrete fence, the concrete house and other improvements that have been erected on the properties registered in the name of Antenor Virata.[64]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the appellate court,
petitioners asseverated that they were denied their defense in assailing the
validity of the subject titles when the court a quo denied the allowance of their Amended Answer. Secondly, they challenged the judgment of the
RTC on the ground that res judicata and
laches had set in to bar the instant action.
They similarly assailed the award of attorney’s fees in favor of respondent.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners’
reliance on a certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite attesting
that there existed no records relative to the administrative reconstitution of
the title of Miguela Crisologo, from whom Antenor bought the subject properties,
constitutes an indirect attack on these titles.
It underscored that if petitioners believed that respondent’s titles
were spurious, they should have filed appropriate proceedings therefor. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that res judicata cannot be appreciated
notwithstanding the previous action (Civil Case No. N-501) instituted by
Antenor for recovery of possession of the subject properties. It emphasized that the case was dismissed on
Anent the issue of laches, the
appellate court ruled that laches could not apply to registered land covered by
the
Finally, ruling on the propriety of
the award of attorney’s fees in respondent’s favor, the appellate court pronounced
that the same must be disallowed on appeal.
It rationalized that the trial court’s decision was bereft of any
findings of fact and law to justify the award of attorney’s fees. No circumstance was shown to warrant the
grant thereof.[67]
Meanwhile, on
The Court of Appeals, in the assailed
Decision of
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit
and the assailed Decision dated
Undeterred, petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration[70] of
the
The Issues
Forthwith, petitioners filed the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
raising the following grounds, to wit:
I.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DECLARING THE SUBJECT LAND TITLES IN THE NAME OF ANTENOR VIRATA AS VALID; [AND]
II.
THAT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT ACTION CONSTITUTE (sic) RES JUDICATA.[71]
In addition, petitioners raised the ground
that it took respondent 27 years to institute the instant action from the time
Civil Case No. N-501 was dismissed.
The Ruling of the Court
For
a full adjudication of the case before us, we shall first resolve the validity
of respondent’s title; and, if in the affirmative, determine whether
respondent’s right to recover the property is barred by res judicata and laches.
A.
Respondent was able to satisfy the requisites of the
law for the filing of an action to quiet title.
An action for quieting of title is a
remedy which may be availed of only when by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the
complainant’s title to real property or any interest therein.
Article 476 of the Civil Code
provides:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to
real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is
in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may
be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or
to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent
a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Further, Article 477[72]
of the same Code mandates that in an action to quiet title, the party bringing
the action must have a legal or, at least, an equitable title[73]
to the real property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud[74]
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid. Verily, for an action to quiet title to
prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.[75]
First.
The determination of the circumstances leading
to Antenor’s acquisition of the subject properties is a factual matter.
The court a quo found that in 1959, Antenor purchased
from Miguela Crisologo two parcels of land located at Palico, Imus,
On appeal, such findings
of facts were not disturbed by the appellate court. Nothing is more settled than the rule that
where, as in the case herein, the findings of fact of the trial court are
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are final and conclusive upon this
Court.[76] Indeed, the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. None of the exceptions[77]
to this rule appears to be present in the case at bar, and so should we apply
the rule with force.
Second. Antero’s certificates of title, as found by
the trial court and sustained by the appellate court, were issued as early as
Well-established is the principle that the person holding
a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a
subsequent certificate. This rule refers
to the date of the certificate of title.
Absent any muniment of title issued prior to 1959 in favor of appellants
[Enrique, et al.] which could prove their ownership over the contested lots,
this Court is left with no other alternative but to declare appellants’ claim
over the properties as void.[79]
B. A collateral attack on respondent’s title over the disputed
properties cannot be allowed.
By express provision of Section 48 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, a certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack,
thus:
SEC. 48. – Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot
be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
When is
an action a direct attack and when is it collateral? This Court made a distinction, to wit:
An
action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or
proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to
which the title was decreed. The attack
is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment,
or enjoin its enforcement. On the other
hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof.[80]
In the case at bar,
petitioners sought to file an Amended Answer, attacking the validity of Antenor’s
title. Therein, it was alleged that
Enrique discovered a certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite
which purports to signify that there was no valid reconstitution of Antenor’s
title. Otherwise stated, they sought to
assert that the aforesaid certification shows that TCT No (T-11171) RT-1228, in
the name of Miguela Crisologo, appeared to have been reconstituted; however, no
record in the Primary Entry Book of said Registry, relative to such
administrative reconstitution can be found.
As submitted, petitioners maintained that the lack of record is a vital
defect, not only to the validity of the reconstitution of Miguela Crisologo’s
title but also to Antenor’s title, which was derived therefrom.
However, the propriety
of the court a quo’s disallowance of
petitioner’s Amended Answer is no longer the subject of the instant Petition,
the same having reached finality.
Indeed, after the denial by the court a quo of Enrique’s Motion to File Amended Answer, he filed his
Pre-Trial Brief on
C. The Decision of the CFI of
Res
judicata
exists when the following elements are present:
(a) the former judgment must
be final;
(b) the court which rendered
judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;
(c) it must be a judgment on
the merits;
(d) and there must be
between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and
cause of action.[81]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Civil Case No. N-501 was
dismissed without prejudice by the CFI of Cavite on
D.
Laches has not set in to
bar respondent from recovering possession of the subject properties.
At first instance,
petitioners asserted that it took respondent a period of 27 years to institute
the instant action since the dismissal of Civil Case No. N-501. Otherwise stated, petitioners seek reliance
on the equitable doctrine of laches.
Laches is defined as the
failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon
grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims for
the peace of society.[84] Indeed, while it is true that a Torrens Title
is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his
right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.[85] However, In the case at bar, laches cannot be
appreciated in petitioners’ favor.
The Court of Appeals said that
respondent could not be faulted for having instituted the action several years
after the dismissal of a case commenced by Antenor himself because it was only
in 1982 that the administratrix for his Estate was appointed, and respondent
allowed petitioners to peacefully vacate the premises. Moreover, the appellate court said that laches
cannot lie against respondent on the ground that petitioners cannot feign
ignorance of the possibility of respondent’s action for quieting of title
because from the time of the dismissal of the case for recovery of possession
in 1969, they knew that another action would be instituted by respondent since
the dismissal of the prior case was without prejudice to the filing of a
subsequent action.
We agree.
For laches to apply, it must be shown
that there was lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that
complainant would assert the right in which he bases his suit.[86] Petitioners cannot be said to be without knowledge
of respondent’s claims over the subject properties as even prior to 1969,
Antenor filed Civil Case N-501, an action for recovery of possession against
Enrique. On
The
Fallo
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72907, dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Mercedes Gozo-Dadole with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and
Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring; Rollo,
pp. 35-49.
[2]
[3] Penned
by Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang; CA rollo,
pp. 15-21.
[4] Records, pp. 1-6.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] TSN,
[35] Records, p. 163.
[36]
[37] CA rollo, p. 18.
[38] Records, pp. 164-168.
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43] Section 3, Rule 11 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 3. Answer to amended complaint.- Where the plaintiff files an amended complaint as a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the same within fifteen (15) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Where its filing is not a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the amended complaint within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the same. An answer earlier filed may serve as the answer to the amended complaint if no new answer is filed.
This Rule shall apply to the
answer to an amended counterclaim, amended cross-claim, amended third (fourth,
etc.)-party complaint, and amended complaint-in-intervention.
[44] Records, p. 180.
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55]
[56]
[57]
[58] Entitled, “Enrique Diaz, John Doe, (Aurora Diaz) v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Bacoor Cavite Sitting at Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 and Elinor A. Virata, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Antenor Virata”; Id. at 391-408.
[59] Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio
S. Labitoria with Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis and Elvi John S.
Asuncion, concurring;
[60]
[61]
[62]
[63]
[64]
[65] CA rollo, pp. 218-219.
[66]
[67]
[68] Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer
R. De los
[69]
[70] CA rollo, 226-229.
[71]
[72] Article 477 of the Civil Code reads:
Article 477. - The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
[73] This Court in PVC Investment & Management Corporation v. Borcena and Ravidas, G.R.
No. 155225.
A
title derived through a valid contract
or relation, and based on recognized equitable principles; the right in
the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal title transferred to him (15
Cyc. 1097; 16
[74] In Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R.
No. 157447,
A cloud on title is an
outstanding instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
actually invalid or inoperative, but which may nevertheless impair or affect
injuriously the title to property. The matter complained of must have a
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. The cloud on title
is a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact
unfounded. The invalidity or inoperativeness of the instrument is not
apparent on the face of such instrument, and it has to be proved by extrinsic
evidence…
[75] Calacala
v. Republic of the
[76] Springsun
Management Systems Croporation v. Camerino, G.R. No. 161029,
[77] In Mamsar Enterprises Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Varley Trading, Inc., G.R. No. 142729, 29 November 2005, 476 SCRA 378, 384, we noted the following exceptions:
1) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjecture; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents and (10) the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
[78] Federated
Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 127967,
[79] Rollo,
p. 45.
[80] Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
152627,
[81] Avisado
v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 137306,
[82] Page-Tenorio
v. Tenorio, G.R. No. 138490,
[83] Isaac
Delgado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137881,
[84] Vda.
de Rigonan v. Derecho, G.R. No. 159571,
[85] Isabela Colleges, Inc. v. Heirs of Nieves Tolentino-Rivera, G.R. No. 132677, 20 October 2000, 344 SCRA 95, 106-107.
[86] In Santos v. Santos, 418 Phil. 681, 692 (2001), we said that the following are the elements of laches, to wit:
1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks
a remedy;
2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct as having
been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which he bases his
suit; and
4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.